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ABSTRACT 
This Project focuses on analysing issues related to full convertibility of RMB 
^ 
current account transactions. In the first part theoretical issues such as benefits and 
types of convertibility are discussed. This is followed by an overview of the cyclical 
trend of balance of payments in China in the 1980s and 1990s, and the evolution of 
the Chinese foreign exchange system since 1978. A more detailed discussion is then 
devoted to liberalization measures introduced in 1994 including replacing the dual 
exchange rate regime by a managed floating rate regime and relaxing trade related 
current account transactions. The project then discusses development of various 
conditions since 1994 for full current account convertibility such as stabilizing 
inflation, improving balance of payment, rising foreign reserve and a stable exchange 
rate. Next is a summary of new liberalization measures on service related current 
account transactions implemented in April 1996. The project then discusses potential 
risks associated with a convertible currency such as depreciation and loss of 
government credibility with reference to the political context of China. Experiences 
of currency fiasco happened in Mexico is examined and policy prescriptions focusing 
on fiscal and monetary discipline, the pursuit of integrated structural reforms are put 
forward. Lastly, it is concluded that barring unpredictable tensions developed 
between China and Taiwan, it is possible that China can achieve full current account 
convertibility before 2000. Business organizations should position for such 
developments in the foreign trade and foreign exchange systems. 
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CHAPTERI 
EVTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
V  
.4 
China has been reforming its currency system on a gradual basis since the adoption 
ofopen door policy in the late 1970s. Such a process has made great strides with the 
announcement in February 1996 a new set ofliberalization measures on service related 
current account transactions. These measures will be implemented starting from April 
1，1996 to achieve Reminbi (RMB) full current account convertibility before 2000. 
With the Chinese economy becoming more and more open and total trade volume 
already equivalent to 45 percent ofGNP in 1994 (Graph 1.1)，it is timely to examine 
issues related to convertibility ofRMB. 
The objective ofthis MBA Project is to analyse issues related to convertibility of 
RMB，its associated risks, policy prescriptions and business implications. The research 
methodology adopted will be a combination of literature review on English academic 
publications, Chinese publications by the People's Bank of China and the Bank of 
China, and interviews with PRC researcher familiar with the convertibility issue. 
The contents ofthe Project are as follows: Chapter II is a review on the economic 
benefits of a convertible currency and outline on the types of convertibility. Chapter 
III analyses the cyclical trend ofbalance ofpayments in China in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Chapter IV summarises the evolution ofthe PRC foreign exchange system in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Chapter V is a detailed discussion on further reform measures 
introduced in 1994 including replacing the dual exchange rate regime by a managed 
floating rate regime, abolition of foreign exchange retention system and opening up 
trade related current account transactions. Chapter VI discusses the current 
2 
development of various conditions for current account convertibility and new 
liberalization measures on service related current account transactions to be 
implemented after April 1996. Chapter VII draws on experiences of developing 
countries such as Mexico and analyses the potential economic and political risks 
associated with RMB convertibility. Chapter VIII suggests a set of policy 
prescriptions attempting to minimi>e potential risks and maximize potential benefits. 
Chapter IX will be a concluding chapter focusing on business implications. 
Graph 1.1 Foreign Trade as a Percentage of GNP in China 
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CHAPTERn 
BENEFITS AND TYPES OF CONVERTffiHJTY ^ 
>• 
Economic Benefits 
According to Claassen (1991), currency reform is an integral part of a 
comprehensive reform packages on tax, fiscal and monetary aspects to transform 
post-socialist economies which are characterized by distorted prices and structural 
imbalances ofrepressed aggregate demand and inefficient enterprises. This is relevant 
to the Chinese economy which still has problems of high inflation, excessive fixed 
asset investment and inefficient state owned enterprises. Although with the adoption 
ofopen door policy, these defects have been corrected to some extent. 
The single most important economic benefits of a convertible currency is that its 
exchange rate will be determined by market forces in the foreign exchange market. 
Such exchange rate will serve as a price signal for allocation of resources between 
import and export and allows a country to participate in international division of 
labour efficiently. For example, if a country has a low level of exchange rate, 
producers will allocate more resources to export because they have cost 
competitiveness in the international economy. In contrast, if a country has an 
expensive level ofexchange rate, consumers will resort to import because they will be 
better ofFby buying cheaper from the international market. 
The benefit of having a market determined exchange rate as price signal for 
allocation ofresources is a more efficient economic regime with higher level of overall 
output through international division of labour. This is particularly relevant to China 
which is transforming itself from a planned economy to a market economy aiming at 
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upgrading productivity and efficiency. 
Before the open door policy, exchange rate ofRMB and international trade had 
been tightly controlled by the Chinese Government. According to Wu and Chen 
(1992), exchange rate ofRMB had been overvalued for most of the time and resulted 
in export being inhibited and a closed economy with limited participation in the 
international division oflabour. Consequently, a convertible RMB with its exchange 
,r 
rate determined by market forces will be an effective tool in rectifying legacy of 
inefficiency resulted from a controlled and overvalued currency. Tam (1995) also 
suggested that with growing openness of the Chinese economy, it becomes 
increasingly urgent for the Chinese Government to reform its exchange policy. Given 
the changeability of the world market and domestic economy, it is difficult for the 
Chinese Government to set an optimal exchange rate which would be better 
determined by market forces if the currency is convertible. 
According to the fifth edition of the Balance of Payments Manual published by 
the International Monetary Fund (EVff) in 1993，the two major items in international 
balance ofpayments are current account and capital account transactions. The degree 
of convertibility in these two types of accounts refers to the degree of transactions 
freedom. Their details are explained as follows: 
Current Account Convertibility 
According to the 1993 Balance of Payments Manuel, "all transactions between 
resident and non-resident entities in economic values other than financial items, 
together with the offsets to economic values of any kind that are provided or acquired 
without a quid pro quo, are covered here under the heading of the current account, 
specifically, goods, services, income, and unrequited transfers." 
Based on the IMF Manuel, Xu and Liu (1994, p.4) explained that resident refers 
to individuals and institutions live or operate in a country for at least one year. 
Transactions between resident and resident, or between non-resident and non-resident 
are normally not counted as current account transactions. 
According to Xu and Liu (1994), transactions of tradable goods is the single 
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most important item of current account transactions. This refers to the change of 
ownership on tradable goods between Chinese and non-Chinese individuals and 
enterprises. Services is the second most important current account transaction item. 
Services include trade related transportation and insurance, port service, tourism, 
labour service and increasingly important items such as telecommunications, copyright, 
financial and computer services. ^ 
z 
Income refers to profits and interest income. This include profits from direct 
investments such as foreign enterprises in China and Chinese enterprises overseas. 
Interests include dividend income from foreign enterprises in China and Chinese 
enterprises overseas and interest receivables from loans provided overseas and interest 
payables to foreign debtors. Unrequited items include remittance from overseas 
Chinese or by foreigners working in China, and donations between countries etc.. 
Capital Account Convertibility 
The 1993 Balance ofPayments Manuel explained that •• the capital account ofthe 
balance ofpayments comprises all transactions - in the restricted sense of changes of 
legal ownership, including the creation and liquidation of claims - in an economy's 
foreign financial assets and liabilities, together with some specified changes of other 
kinds that may affect its foreign assets and liabilities and the counterparts to those 
changes." 
Xu and Liu (1994) elaborated that such foreign financial assets include direct 
investments, portfolio investments and reserve assets. 
Direct investments are investments with a lasting interest in operating enterprises. 
Investors of direct investments are active investors with effective control on the 
management of such enterprises. Portfolio investments include equity securities, debt 
securities, money market instruments and financial derivatives such as options and 
futures. As different from direct investments, portfolio investments are passive and 
investors do not intend to have management control. Reserve assets consist of 
external assets controlled by the governments for direct financing of payment 
imbalances, and for indirectly regulating the magnitude of such imbalances through 
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intervention in exchange markets to affect their currency's exchange rate. Reserve 
assets comprises monetary gold, Special Drawing Rights in JMF, reserve positions in 
the JMF, foreign exchange assets and other claims. 
Since the timetable of the Chinese Government is to achieve full current account 
convertibility before 2000 and convertibility of capital account would only be 









The most important characteristics of balance of payment development in China 
since the early 1980s include declining relative importance of current account 
transactions in total balance ofpayments, and structural change within items ofcurrent 
and capital transactions (Xu and Liu 1994, p.52). 
In 1982，the breakdown between current and capital account transactions in total 
balance of payments was 86 percent and 13 percent respectively. Such ratio was 
altered to 73 percent and 26 percent in 1994. This indicated the shifting relative 
importance between current and capital account transactions driven by massive inflow 
offoreign direct investments from US$ 430 mn in 1982 to US$ 33.8 bn in 1994 into 
the capital account. 
Within the current account category, there has been growing importance ofexport 
of manufactured goods and untraditional services such as consultancy, labour service, 
copyright and patent, indicating China is able to produce higher value added goods and 
services. Within the capital account, direct investment becomes increasingly important 
and its share in the capital account inflow rose from 12 percent in 1982 to 54.7 percent 
in 1994, contributing to the rising share of capital account transactions in total balance 
ofpayments discussed earlier. 
In addition, China has been able to maintain healthy growth of foreign exchange 
reserve which has been sufficient to cover external payment requirements. With the 
abolition offoreign exchange retention system in 1994，foreign reserve shot up sharply 
8 
from US$ 21.2 bn in 1993 to US$ 73.6 bn in 1995 (Graph 3.1). Reasons for such 
strong growth will be discussed in Chapter V. 
Graph 3.1 Foreign Exchange Reserve in China 
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Trend ofCurrent Account Balance (Graph 3.2) 
Xu and Liu (1994) had given a detailed account on the development of current 
and capital account balance in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Since the adoption of open door policy in 1979，China gradually liberalized its 
foreign trade by setting up more trading companies and decentralizing import and 
export authorizations. As China had strong need to import capital goods for economic 
development and quality consumer goods for consumption, trade decentralization 
resulted in massive growth of import in the early 1980s. The trade surplus dropped 
from US$47.8 bn in 1982 to deficit ofUS$ 13.1 mn in 1985. Since trade is the single 
most important item of current account transactions, current account balance 
accordingly declined from a surplus ofUS$ 5.7 bn in 1982 to deficit o fUS$ 11.4 bn in 
1985. 
Such a sizable current account deficit was alarming for the Chinese Government. 
Controlling measures such as tariff and foreign exchange allocation were imposed to 
curb import. RMB was also depreciated to 3.2 per US dollar in October 1985 to 
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boost export. Subsequently, the strengthening of oil price and exchange rate of 
Japanese Yen and Deutche Mark in the mid 1980s helped to boost export earnings. 
The current account deficit was narrowed from US$ 7.0 bn in 1986 to US$ 4.3 bn in 
1989. 
From 1990 to 1991 China entered a period of adjustment to tackle problems of 
high growth and high inflation starting from the mid 1980s. During this adjustment 
period import was further restricted as a result of control on fixed asset investments 
and credit tightening. Export was again boosted by liberalization ofexport regime and 
depreciation o f R M B to 5.18 per US dollar in 1990. Current account balance was 
reversed from deficit in the second half of 1980s to a surplus ofUS$ 12.0 bn in 1990 
andUS$ 13.3 bn in 1991. 
With the Chinese economy bottoming out from the recession and resuming fast 
growth in 1992, import grew faster than export. Current account surplus dropped 
from US$ 6.4 bn in 1992 to a deficit o fUS$ 11.9 bn in 1993. In 1994，the Chinese 
Government again adopted austerity measures such as tight credit and control on fixed 
asset investments. Assisted by depreciation ofRMB from 5,8 to 8.7 per US dollar and 
merging the official and swap market exchange rates, current account surplus rose 
sharply to US$ 7.66 bn in 1994. 
Trend ofCapital Account Balance (Graph 3.2) 
In 1982 China recorded a capital account surplus ofUS$338 mn caused by inflow 
offoreign direct investment o fUS$ 430 mn，which was 52 percent higher than 1981. 
In 1983 and 1984，owing to availability of foreign reserve which was used to investing 
in foreign securities and repaying loan provided by the JMF, capital account of China 
was in deficit o fUS$ 226 mn and US$1.0 bn respectively. However, the dollar value 
ofcapital account balance in these three years remained small. 
From 1985 to 1988, the capital account exhibited a stable pattem of surplus of 
around averaged US$ 7.0 bn per annum. This was attributable to the steady growth of 
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foreign direct investment. In 1989 and 1990, inflow of foreign direct investments 
slowed down as a result of austerity measures and the Tiananmen Event. Coupled 
with repayment offoreign debt, capital account surplus decreased to US$ 3.7 bn and 
US$3.3 bn in 1989 and 1990. 
From 1991 onwards, the capital account again reported surplus due to strong 
inflow offoreign direct investment; The surplus rose from US$ 8.0 bn in 1991 to US$ 
32.6 bn in 1994. 
Graph 3.2 Balance of Current and Capital Accounts in China 
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Cyclical Nature ofBalance ofPayments 
The above analysis indicated clearly that balance of payments in China follows a 
zigzag pattem which is closely related to the ups and downs of the Chinese economic 
cycles. During times of economic expansion, inflation rate shoots up, real exchange 
rate ofRMB appreciates and import grows rapidly. With aggregate demand exceeds 
aggregate supply, the current account runs into deficit. Subsequently the Chinese 
Government intervenes. The imposition of austerity measures and depreciation of 
RMB curb import and boost export. With aggregate demand brought down to below 
the level ofaggregate supply, current account balance is restored. The trend ofcapital 
11 
account balance follows a similar pattern. During times of economic expansion, inflow 
of foreign investment accelerates while in times of slowing down, such inflow 
decelerates from a relative high base built up previously. 
Such casual relationships between economic growth and balance of payment, 
exchange rate and balance ofpayment have important policy implications which will be 
discussed in Chapter VHI. ^ 
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CHARTERW 
EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGEME SmCE 1978 w 
X 
Tam (1995) gave a comprehensive account on the evolution of the Chinese 
foreign trade and foreign exchange regimes from 1978 to early 1990s. According to 
Tam, prior to the open door policy in 1978 foreign trade was completely monopolised 
by the state foreign trade corporations. Foreign trade corporations merely executed 
the central government's foreign trading activities but their own productivity and 
profitability were not important. The Chinese economy was a closed economy and 
RMB exchange rate mainly played an accounting role. During that period, exchange 
rate was deliberately overvalued to make import of capital goods less expensive but 
competitiveness of export was undermined. 
Trade Liberalization 
Starting from 1978，an outward-oriented strategy has been adopted with an 
emphasis on the role of exports in growth. From 1979 to 1983，the monopoly of 
foreign trade organizations was gradually broken up and foreign trade was 
decentralised to local governments and enterprises. However, production and export 
were still separated. Foreign trade enterprises purchased goods from production 
enterprises for export while the latter were only responsible for manufacturing. At the 
same time, foreign trade enterprises competed amongst themselves for export goods to 
fulfil export targets and led to an increase in export costs. To avoid such competition, 
foreign trade was again concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade during 1984-6. 
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In 1987, a contract responsibility system was introduced to foreign trade 
corporations to give these enterprises greater freedom in trading. Under the new 
system, foreign trade enterprises signed contracts with the Government with regard to 
export plans, export costs, and profits and losses. To encourage export, local 
governments and enterprises were allowed to keep large part of foreign exchange 
earnings ifexport targets are exceeded. Central planning for imports and exports was 
reduced to a only a few goods, and the market element in foreign trade was much 
expanded. 
In 1988，further reforms including abolition ofexport subsidies and retention o fup 
to 75 per cent offoreign exchange earnings by local enterprises were introduced to 
encourage more export. In January 1991, foreign trade corporations were completely 
responsible for their own profits and losses. 
Control on Current Account Transactions 
According to Tam (1995), before 1987 import was mainly controlled by 
administrative measures. Import by an enterprise had to be approved by its supervising 
government department. During the same period export was decentralized with 
establishment of more export channels. 
Apart from official approvals, an import-export licensing system was introduced in 
1987 to strengthen controls over importing and exporting activities and to improve 
their product structure. In addition to licensing, quotas allocated by the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade were also used to control importing and 
exporting activities. The actual value of goods traded was a result of government 
planning but not a response to profitability. 
Moreover, subsidies were also given to import and export enterprises. Such 
subsidies included price subsidies and policy loss subsidies. The former referred to 
compensations given to importers who were required to sell imported goods at the 
Government set price which was below their costs. Policy loss subsidies referred to 
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subsidies for exporters to cover their loss arising from overvaluation ofRMB. These 
subsidies were costly to the economy. Finally, export subsidy was abolished m 1991 
with the implementation ofcontract responsibility system. 
Apart from these administrative controls on import and export trade, all 
transactions o fRMB related to trade had to get approvals from State Administration 
ofBxchange Control. The re fo re , cu r r en t account transactions on goods before 1994 
were tightly controlled. 
5 ^ ^ 5 ^ g ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ l ^ ^ l 2 I L » n L i I ^ ^ ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ £ ^ « 
ln 1981 a formal dual exchange rate system was introduced to adjust the 
overvalued exchange rate without the domestic sector and n o n — d i t y trade being 
adversely affected by exchange rate changes. The Chinese Government set an mten^al 
exchange rate (RMB2.8 per US dollar) for commodity trade and maintained the 
official rate (RMB1.53 per US dollar) for non-commodity trade. As the US dollar 
depreciated in 1984, the official exchange rate was devalued to RMB2.79 per US 
dollar, closing the gap between the official and intemal rates. Thus, from J « 1985 
the intemal exchange rate was abolished and the exchange rate system was retumed to 
a unified regime. 
In the days of closed door policy all foreign exchange earnings were kept by the 
state The most important development after 1978 was the setting up of the foreign 
exchange retention system to encourage export. This new system allowed local 
enterprises and provinces to retain the bulk oftheir foreign exchange eamings. With 
the development offoreign exchange retention system since 1979’ the retained foreign 
exchange eamings formed the basis for an exchange market. 
With approval by the State Council and the People's Bank of China，the Shenzhen 
Swap Centre was established in December 1995 and other swap centres were set up 
subsequently. In contrast to the official rate, swap rate was determined by demand and 
supply Consequently, China is again moving gradually to a dual exchange rate regime 
15 
since the establishment of swap centres. 
Under such a dual exchange rate regime, the official rate and the swap rate always 
moved away from each other. This put pressure on the 0伍6&1 rate to devalue. In 
December 1989，the official rate was devalued by 21.2 percent to RMB 4.72 per US 
dollar. Following the abolition of government subsidies and an increase of retention 
rate by enterprises in January 1991, the foreign exchange swap centres were playing 
more and more important role. However, with the existence ofindirect subsidies and 
intervention, the effect of exchange rate changes on export production was still 
distorted. 
In 1994 the Chinese Government took progressive measures in opening up trade 
related current account transactions which will be discussed in next chapter. However, 
administrative control in forms ofquota, licensing and tariff still exist nowadays. They 
are expected to fade out gradually over the next few years as the Chinese Government 
is negotiating to join the World Trade Organization. 
Graph 4.1 Exchange Rate of RMB from 1978 to 1994 
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CHAPTERV 
DEVELOPMENT OF CONVERTffiELITY EV 1994 
,虞 
Achieved Convertibility On Trade Related Transactions 
After gradually reforming the foreign exchange system since 1978, the Chinese 
Government achieved breakthrough in 1994 by unifying the dual exchange rate of 
RMB, eliminating the foreign exchange retention system, establishing an interbank 
foreign exchange market and setting up a managed floating exchange rate regime. The 
People's Bank ofChina (1995) had given a detailed account on these new measures. 
In January 1994, the official exchange rate o fRMB 5.8 per US dollar and the 
exchange rate in the swap market ofRMB 8.7 per US dollar were unified. The former 
was set by the Chinese Government while the latter was determined by supply and 
demand in the swap markets. Unifying the two exchange rates was an official 
devaluation ofRMB. After the unification，the exchange rate ofRMB is determined 
by supply and demand under a managed floating rate regime. 
In addition, the former foreign exchange retention system was replaced by a bank 
settlement and surrender system under which all state enterprises are required to close 
their foreign exchange accounts and sell their foreign exchange holdings to the 
designated banks at the market exchange rate. If these enterprises need foreign 
exchange to finance import, they can buy from the designated banks at the market 
exchange rate. Under this new system although import approvals are still required, 
consent from the local bureaus of State Administration on Exchange Control is no 
longer needed in foreign exchange transactions as long as the enterprises can provide 
documents supporting such transactions are trade related. 
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To summarize, in spite of continuous existence of administrative control such as 
import authorization, quota, licensing and tariff, the above new measures effectively 
allow freedom of RMB transactions on trade related items and has achieved 
conditional current account convertibility ofRMB. 
To facilitate interbank transactions, a national foreign exchange market called the 
China Foreign Exchange Trading System was set up in Shanghai in April 1994. I f the 
foreign exchange positions of designated banks exceed the limits imposed by the 
central bank, these positions have to be sold to the central bank through the foreign 
exchange market. In 1994，turnover of this national foreign exchange market 
amounted to US$ 40.47 bn. The tight credit policy introduced since 1994 resulted in 
strong demand for and limited supply ofRMB because state enterprises' access to bank 
credit was substantially reduced. As a result, net buying of foreign exchange in 1994 
was US$ 8.96 bn while net selling was US$ 39.96 bn. With demand significantly 
larger than supply, the exchange rate ofRMB appreciated from RMB 8.7 per US$ at 
the beginning of 1994 to RMB 8.446 per US dollar at the end of the same year. This 
trend continued and RMB further appreciated to 8.32 per US dollar in February 1996 
(Graph5.1). 
Graph 5.1 Exchange Rate ofRMB from 1994 to 1996 
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China's Choice ofAMana^ed Floating Rate Regime 
The exchange rate regime created from the 1994 reform packages is a managed 
floating rate system. Like the independent floating rate system of the US，Japan and 
Germany, exchange rate under a managed floating rate regime is determined by market 
forces. However, unlike the independent floating rate system adopted by developed 
countries, the managed floating rate system is characterized by a regulated foreign 
exchange market which allows more government interventions on the exchange rate. 
In short, it is a floating rate system with tight government control. 
China's choice of a management floating rate system is in line with the 
development in the international financial markets. According to a survey by JMF in 
1994 (Graph 5.2)，there has been an almost universally one way shift from peg rate 
regimes toward more flexible arrangements such as managed floating rate and 
independently floating rate regimes. 
Claassen (1991) explained that pegged rate regime is mainly suitable for small, 
open economies whose trade pattem are dominated by one or two trading partners. 
However, monetary authorities can only choose to fix the inflation rate or exchange 
rate but not both. Pegging one's currency to another currency means adopting the 
monetary policy ofthe another country. Countries that have high inflation rate or may 
experience extemal shocks from time to time opt for managed floating rate regime to 
allow them to move their exchange rates to levels matching their inflation target or 
accommodating extemal shocks such as rising import costs. 
Peg rate regime is obviously not suitable for China which is a sizable economy 
with its own monetary policy. An independent floating rate regime may create danger 
ofmassive capital flight which would be damaging to Chinese economy. Consequently, 
a managed floating rate regime becomes a logical choice. 
19 
Graph 5.2 Trends in Selected Exchange Regimes 
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According to interview with Zhang Joe ofW.I. Carr O a^r East) Limited (1996)， 
under the managed floating rate regime, the Chinese Government can regulate the 
RMB exchange rate by administrative control on foreign exchange market 
participation, monetary policy, market interventions and personnel control. 
Currently Chinese enterprises and individuals cannot buy and sell foreign exchange 
freely in the market. They have to provide documents to prove such transactions are 
related to trade, travel, overseas study, family remittance etc.. Such administrative 
control effectively blocks speculative trading offoreign exchange. Even though rural 
and urban deposits ofRMB 2151.9 bn (VS$ 254.8 bn) as at the end of 1994 (Graph 
5.3)，which was much larger than the size offoreign reserve, it is extremely difficult to 
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challenge the Government's exchange rate policy. In addition，the Chinese 
Government can intervene RMB exchange rate by altering monetary policy. If money 
supply is tightened and domestic interest rate is increased, RMB selling pressure will 
be reduced and exchange rate can be stabUized. Vice versa, if money supply is 
increased, there will be more selling ofRMB and its exchange rate will be weakened. 
•V 
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Graph 5.3 Savings Deposits of Urban and Rural Residents in China 
RMBBn 
25000 • 
20000 • > ^ 
15000 ^ . ^ ^ 
10000 • • '"""'^ 
5000 • ' ^ ^ ^ 
o i ‘ ^ 
89 90 91 92 93 94 
Source: Almanac ofChina's Finance and Banking 1995 
With a huge foreign reserve of US$ 73.6 bn at the end of 1995，the Chinese 
Government can intervene RMB exchange rate in the market directly by buying RMB 
and selling foreign reserve, or by selling RMB and buying foreign exchange. As there 
was more supply offoreign currency in the market in both 1994 and 1995，the central 
bank was net seller of RMB for the last two years and this explained why foreign 
reserve went up sharply from US$ 21.2 bn at the end of 1993 to US$ 73.6 bn at the 
end o f l995 (Graph3.1). 
Lastly, as all the domestic banks in China are owned by the state, the Chinese 
Government has total control on appointment ofbank personnel. Any uncooperative 




CONDITIONS FOR CONVERTffiBLITY 
Conditions for full current account convertibility include the following: price 
stability, favourable balance of payment, sufficient foreign reserve and exchange rate 
stability (Tan Jian Jun，1994). These factors are vital to maintain a stable exchange 
rate and enhance government credibility to ensure a successful transformation to full 
current account convertibility. 
Stable Domestic Price 
According to Wu and Chen (1992)，determination ofRMB exchange rate should 
be based on purchasing power parity. Therefore a stable domestic price and inflation 
rate are vital to prepare for free transactions of RMB related to current account 
payments. If inflation rate soars, purchasing power within China will be eroded and 
will eventually lead to depreciation of RMB. As discussed in Chapter II，China is 
transforming herself from a socialist economy to market economy and what China 
needs at this stage is to control excess demand and inflation arising from structural 
imbalances. 
Domestic inflation ofChina has been exhibiting a zigzag pattern following the ups 
and downs of its economic cycle. With the bottoming out of the Chinese economy in 
1991，inflation had been on the uptrend and accelerated to 14.7 percent in 1993. The 
imposition of the austerity measures and control on excessive capital investments 
starting from mid 1993 eventually put inflation under control. Inflation peaked in 1994 
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at 24.1 percent and subsequently came offto 16.8 percent in 1995 (Graph 6.1). 
Graph 6.1 Inflation in China 
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balance figure is not yet available. China achieved a trade surplus o fUS$ 16.7 bn in 
1995，indicating continuous improvement in balance ofpayment. 
Sufficient Foreign Reserve 
The size offoreign exchange reserve is a key factor affecting a country's extemal 
payment ability and its government's ability to intervene in the foreign exchange market 
to maintain exchange rate stability. To maintain public confidence, the concensus is 
the size of foreign reserve should be able to cover three months' import. Or ifthere is 
abnormal selling pressure on RMB caused by excessive import, rising domestic 
inflation, deterioration of balance of payments, or political instability, the Chinese 
Government may need to sell foreign exchange and buy RMB in the market to 
maintain public confidence. Consequently, the size offoreign reserve will determine 
the Government's ability to intervene in the foreign exchange market. 
However, it should be noted that a stable price environment and healthy balance of 
payments are preconditions to maintain exchange rate stability. Interventions in the 
foreign exchange market can only be treated as a temporary measure. Although such 
interventions under a managed floating rate regime with limited speculative 
participations can be more effective than similar actions under an independent floating 
rate regime. 
Owing to strong export growth, continuous inflow offoreign direct investments 
and in particular replacing the foreign exchange retention system by the bank 
settlement and surrender system discussed in Chapter V，foreign exchange reserve shot 
up sharply from only US$ 30.4 bn in 1993 to US$ 51.6 bn in 1994 and US$ 73.6 bn in 
1995. Such a high level of foreign exchange reserve is the reason for the Chinese 
Government announcing further liberalizations on service related current account 
transactions in 1996 (Graph 3.1). 
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Exchange Rate Stability 
A stable exchange rate is important to maintain public's confidence on their 
currency. It is vital to achieve and maintain exchange rate stability prior to and after 
liberalization ofcurrent account transactions. 
Since the relaxation on trade related current account transactions in 1994, RMB 
exchange rate has remained stabler As contrasted to the consensus that RMB will 
depreciate, its exchange rate in fact appreciated by 4.4 percent from RMB 8.7 per US 
dollar at the beginning of 1994 to RMB 8.32 per US dollar at the end of 1995 (Graph 
5 1). As explained earlier, continuous inflow of foreign direct investments, the tight 
credit policy and the resulted shortage ofworking capital amongst state enterprises led 
to limited supply ofRMB and strengthened its exchange rate during the last two years. 
Being encouraged by declining domestic inflation, improving balance ofpayments, 
growing foreign reserve and a stable RMB exchange rate, the Chinese Government 
announced in February 1996 further liberalization measures in service related current 
account transactions to be implemented in April 1996 as follows (State Council of 
China 1996): 
T .iberalization Measures on Service Transactions implemented In 1996 
_ Chinese enterprises must sell all hard currency earnings to designated banks or 
hold them in foreign currency bank accounts. Foreign currency earnings cannot 
be held outside China. 
_ Chinese citizens can hold foreign currency in banks or sell them to banks on a 
voluntary basis. No private trading is permitted. 
- F o r e i g n investors can remit profits, dividend and interest earnings out of China 
from their foreign currency accounts or can convert RMB into hard currency at 
designated banks. They can deal with designated banks directly and no longer 
require approvals from the State Administration on Exchange Control. 
- C h i n e s e citizens can remit RMB out from China for the purpose of travel, 
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supporting overseas relatives, overseas studies and immigration. 
_ Capital account transactions will continue to be tightly regulated as before. 
I 
i . 
i In summary, these new measures to be implemented in 1996 effectively liberalize 
transactions in the service and income related items after trade related current account 
transactions were opened up in 1994. 
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CHAPTER V n 
RISKS OF CONVERTffiMTY 
,^ 
Chapter II has discussed thoroughly the benefits of RMB convertibility in 
allocating resources efficiently between production for export and production for 
import. This will facilitate China's participation in the international division of labour 
and results in a higher level ofoutput. 
However, the transformation to current account convertibility is not without risks. 
Such risks include depreciation ofRMB as China has strong import demand, negative 
impact on inflation as a result ofRMB depreciation, and the credibility of the Chinese 
Government being consequently undermined. In this regard, reviewing the currency 
fiasco happened in Mexico will be enlightening to understand the risks China facing. 
Peso Depreciation in Mexico 
The Mexican Peso suffered from a serious run from late December 1994 to mid 
March 1995 with the exchange rate ofPeso dived from 3.46 to 7.45 per US dollar in 
three months' time. Such a sharp drop in exchange rate jerked up the Mexican 
overnight interest rate to rocket high level of85 percent, which was devastating for the 
Mexican economy. The whole crisis only began to stablize with a US$ 50 bn loan 
guarantee provided by the US Government, the Bank ofIntemational Settlements and 
the JMF. 
According to the The Economist (28 Jan. 1995)，the Peso Fiasco was mainly 
caused by the lack of fiscal and monetary discipline by the Mexican Government. 
Excessive demand created by the budget deficit and fiielled by money supply led to 
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massive import of consumption goods and a current account deficit equalled to eight 
percent of GDP. Ironically, the bulk of such current account deficit was financed by 
short term capital in the form of portfolio investments but not the more stable direct 
investment. When the portfolio investors realised that the peso could not be sustained 
on such a high level of current account deficit, they shunned the currency and triggered 
the Peso Crisis. . -
The Peso vicious cycle caused by the lack offiscal，monetary discipline and current 
account deficit is enlightening for China. Although China has been enjoying favourable 
balance ofpayment in both 1994 and 1995，there are already signals that both export 
and foreign direct investment inflow are slowing down. 
Export Slowing Down in China 
Chinese export was given a strong boost in 1994 by the unification of dual 
exchange rate and effective devaluation ofRMB from 5.8 to 8.7 per US dollar. Export 
growth recorded remarkable growth of31.9 percent and 22.9 percent in 1994 and 1995 
respectively. However, as indicated in Graph 7.1, the year on year growth rate of 
monthly export from January 1995 to February 1996 has been on a down trend， 
indicating export is running out of steam. Since export enterprises may need three to 
six months to collect receivables, slowing export growth has not yet been reflected in 
the exchange rate ofRMB which is still on the up trend (Graph 5.1). However, ifthere 
is no recovery of export growth, pressure on RMB depreciation may emerge in the 
second hal fof l996 or 1997. 
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Graph 7.1 Monthly Import and Export Growth Rate in 1995 and 1996 
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Cumulative Inflation 
According to Zhang Joe of W.I. Carr (Far East) Limited (1996)，the most 
important reason causing export slowing down is cumulative inflation. Although 
inflation went down from 24.1 percent in 1994 to 16.8 percent in 1995，the cumulative 
inflationary effect may have eliminated the benefits ofRMB depreciation in 1994. The 
real exchange rate ofRMB should have appreciated. 
The replacement of foreign exchange retention system by the bank settlement and 
surrender system was the most important reason for the 24 percent inflation in 1994. 
With more supply offoreign exchange by state enterprises in the market, the People's 
Bank of China had to sell RMB to avoid appreciation. In 1994 the asset structure of 
the People's Bank of China changed significantly. The proportion of domestic credit 
and treasury overdraft decreased from 83.3 percent and 9.3 percent in 1993 to 16.7 
percent and 2.5 percent in 1994，while that offoreign reserve increased sharply from 7 
percent in 1993 to 75.1 percent in 1994 O>eople,s Bank of China 1995，p.22). The net 
result of People's Bank buying foreign exchange in the market was increasing the 
money supply o f R M B and growth rate o f M 2 in 1994 was as high as 34.4 percent 
(People's Bank ofChina 1995，p.31). 
In 1995 the one off effect ofPeople's Bank of China selling RMB to buy foreign 
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exchange supplied by state enterprises diminished. With the continuous imposition of 
tight credit policy, growth ofM2 and inflation slowed to 29.5 percent and 16.8 percent 
in 1995. 
In 1996 the Chinese Government targets to further bring down inflation to 10 
percent. However, more price deregulations will also be pursued in 1996 in order to 
improve allocation of resources in^the Chinese economy. For example, the Chinese 
Government announced in April 1996 that price control on 22 large cement plants will 
be lifted. Other basic items such as food, cotton, crude oil, non-ferrous metal etc. are 
all targets ofprice deregulations. Therefore，inflation driven by price reform in 1996 
may be deterring to export growth although it is difficult to predict its effect precisely 
at this stage. 
Budget Deficit 
Another source ofinflation in China is the government budget deficit. China has 
been suffering from a difficult fiscal situation (Graph 7.2). Government revenue 
growth has been lagging behind economic growth in current prices. The revenue to 
GDP ratio has continued to decline. Although the Chinese government started to 
implement tax reforms measures in 1994 such as the introduction ofvalue added tax 
and tax sharing system between central and local government aiming to increase 
revenue, budget deficit still amounted to RMB 63.6 bn in 1994 and RMB 62.1 bn in 
1995. Given the fact that a lot ofinefficient state enterprises still rely on government 
subsidies, the People's Bank of China (1995) admitted that controlling expenditure 
growth will be a challenging task and the declining ratio of revenue to GDP is not 
expected to be reversed in the short run. 
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Graph 7.2 Chinese Government Revenue and Expenditure 
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T^kk oflmport Surgtnp with China entering World Trade Organization 
Owing to cumulative effect ofdomestic inflation in 1994 and 1995，import growth 
showed a mild recovery in 1995 and was up by 14 percent versus only 10 percent in 
1994. IfChina enters the World Trade Organization shortly, import will be stimulated 
significantly and may result in large trade deficit. As a developing country, China has 
strong appetite for import. With the abolition of administrative import control and 
tariff，the great potential demand for import can be tumed into a reality (People's Bank 
of China 1995). To prepare for joining the World Trade Organization, China has 
already announced a series oftariffcut in April 1996. 
Foreign Direct Investment Slowing Down 
After three years of strong growth offoreign direct investment, such inflow also 
begins to show signs ofweakness. Although actual paid in foreign direct investment 
amounted to a record level ofUS$ 33.7 bn in 1994 and was 22.8 percent above the 
1993 level, the value ofnew contracts ofUS$ 81.41 bn was 32.7 percent below 1993. 
This had affected the level ofpaid up foreign capital in 1995 which was only US$ 37.7 
bn, and may further slow down inflow offoreign direct investment into the 1996 capital 
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account (Graph 7.3). 
The slow down in export and inflow offoreign direct investment both may create 
negative pressure on current account and capital account balances and exert 
depreciation pressure on RMB in the coming years. 
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Political Risks within China and across the Formosa Strait 
The political context of China is another element of risk that may accentuate the 
potential risk ofRMB depreciation. The new generation ofChinese leaders selected by 
paramount leader Deng Xiao Ping need to justify their legitimacy by achieving fast 
economic growth. The pressure for growth becomes more acute in times of economic 
slow down because the aspiration of the Chinese public have been substantially 
increased as a result of the open door policy. However, if the pursuit for growth 
undermines fiscal and monetary discipline, there will be negative repercussions on the 
exchange rate ofRMB. 
A newly emerged political variable that may affect exchange rate of RMB is the 
current tensions between Mainland China and Taiwan. Additional fimding and 
financing for military expenditure will increase aggregate demand but decrease 
aggregate supply because military campaigns will only result in destructions. On the 
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Other hand, additional money supply will increase aggregate demand. The net result of 
higher aggregate demand than aggregate supply is undoubtedly higher inflation. The 
tension across the Formosa Strait can be an influential variable although it is difficult to 
quantity its effect precisely because the post election attitude of the Taiwanese 






The Chinese Government is caught in a dilemma that the move towards current 
account convertibility brings the benefits ofefficient allocation ofresources but risks 
o fRMB depreciation. Nevertheless, being encouraged by favourable development in 
overall balance of payment, domestic inflation, level of foreign reserve and RMB 
exchange rate since the unification ofdual exchange rate and liberalization of t rade 
related current account transactions in 1994，the Chinese Government chooses to go 
ahead with fiirther liberalization of service related current account transactions in 
1996. In the following I attempt to recommend policy prescriptions that may 
contribute to reap the benefits of current account convertibility while minimizes the 
potential risks. Since political risks such as the tensions between China and Taiwan is 
difficult to quantify, the recommendations will focus on economic policies. 
Maintain Balance ofPayments 
In order to avoid sharp RMB depreciation after opening up the current account， 
it is most important to maintain balance of payments. Xu and Liu (1994, p.26) 
identified three sources ofpayment imbalance: cyclical imbalance caused by economic 
cycles，structural imbalance caused inability of exporting countries to adjust their 
export mix in response to changes in foreign demand, monetary imbalance caused by 
inflation cycles which in tum affect export cost. 
As discussed in Chapter III，cyclical and monetary imbalances are the most 
relevant sources ofintemational payment imbalance because current account deficit 
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normally occurs during times of fast economic growth, accelerating inflation, and 
monetary expansion which increase the cost of export and encourage import. 
Structural imbalance is a less influential factor because China has been gradually 
upgrading its export mix and is exporting more and more manufactured goods (Xu 
andLiu, 1994). 
In order to enter the World Xrade Organization, it will be increasingly difficult 
for the Chinese Government to resort to administrative measures such as quota, 
licensing and tariffto maintain balance ofpayments. International payment imbalance 
will eventually lead to depreciation ofRMB and such devaluation will undermine the 
credibility of the new foreign exchange regime. Therefore，fiscal and monetary 
discipline to avoid excessive boom and bust growth pattem are the key measures to 
maintain balance of payments especially in the current account. Capital account 
balance is less a problem to worry because unlike the case ofMexico，the Chinese 
capital market is still tightly regulated with portfolio investments only accounted for 
very small portion ofcapital account transactions. 
Fiscal & Monetary Discipline 
The budget of the Chinese Government has been in deficit for most o f the time 
since the open door policy. As similar to developing countries in Latin America， 
China has a big public sector despite of the rapid growth ofindividually and foreign 
owned enterprises in recent years. In order to control excessive aggregate demand, 
the Chinese Government should reduce budget deficit by cutting subsidies to state 
enterprises, increase effectiveness oftax collection and raise tax revenue. 
Secondly, the Chinese Government should adopt a disciplined monetary policy 
and control excessive growth ofmoney supply which fuels inflation. The tight money 
policy since 1994 has brought down inflation to 16.8 percent in 1995. Although 
currently Chinese enterprises are suffering from recession, in view o fmore price 
reform being pursued and cumulative inflation built up during the last cycle of fast 
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growth, the Chinese Government should not relax money supply on a massive scale. 
In the ninth five year plan commencing 1996，the Chinese Government should 
continue to adopt a disciplined monetary policy which deters state enterprises 
pursuing blind growth due to easy availability ofcredit. 
The question now remains is how tight the fiscal and monetary policy should be. 
Instead of pursuing a quantitative answer, I would like to refer to Claassen's view. 
Claassen (1991) suggested that a proper fiscal and monetary policy should be able to 
maintain internal balances, which means achieving the highest level ofoutput under a 
controllable level ofinflation. Different countries have different level ofappropriate 
inflation. Judging from the experiences of Asian countries, such level should be at 
around 8 percent to 10 percent. The Chinese Government is targeting to reduce 
inflation to 10 percent in 1996. 
Tmprove Efficiency ofForeign Exchange Market 
Various measures should be taken to improve efficiency of foreign exchange 
system. For example, the inter bank foreign exchange market and swap centers 
should be combined to create higher level ofliquidity. Foreign exchange management 
regulations accumulated for years should be systematized so that effective regulations 
can be promulgated. Transparency of the foreign exchange market should be 
increased to make the foreign exchange administration system conform with 
international practices. An international payments and receipts declaration system 
should be set up to improve quality ofdebt management (Tao Shi Gui, 1995). 
Strengthen Economic and Financial Reforms 
A convertible currency is only one ofthe price signals for efficient allocation of 
resources. Apart from currency reform, the Chinese Government should continue to 
pursuing financial and enterprise reforms to correct problems of structural imbalances. 
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Domestic interest rate should be liberalized to reflect the cost of capital and inflation. 
Banks are urged to managed their credit risk and balance sheet properly. Tax system 
should also be changed to create a level playing ground between state enterprises and 
foreign enterprises and between export and import enterprises. It is only when the 
inefficient legacy ofthe planned economy be rectified can a convertible RMB perform 
its function as a price signal effectively. 
Avoid Premature Capital Account Convertibility 
Recently there are arguments for earlier opening up ofcapital account transaction 
(Wang Xin Kui, 1995). The reasons put forward is the forms of foreign investments 
have changed from predominantly direct investments targeting export market in the 
1980s to rising importance of direct investment targeting domestic market and 
portfolio investments. Capital account convertibility will help to attract these new 
types ofinvestments. 
I agree with Claassen (1991) that capital account transaction should only be 
opened up after full completion of current account convertibility. It is because with 
the opening up of current account transactions, the trade sector takes time to 
consolidate and improve efficiency in view of more competition. If the capital 
account is opened up prematurely, inflow ofcapital may lead to appreciation which is 
prohibitive to export and affects balance of payment adversely. 
Moreover, China's transformation from a planned economy to market economy 
will not be a smooth process and inherent risks such as capital flight exists. It is 
important for China to hold a tight grip on capital account transactions before the full 
completion ofcurrent account convertibility and trade sector consolidation. Take the 
case ofJapan as an example, Japan placed high priority on stabilization and continue 
to maintain tight control on capital account convertibility after achieving current 
account convertibility. 
Currently the Chinese Government is holding a conservative view on capital 
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account convertibility. According to Lu Yu Ping (Feb 26，1996)，capital account 
convertibility will not be pursued before the M completion of current account 
convertibility, which is expected to be not later than 2000. I would recommend the 
Chinese Government be persistent with such timetable. 
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C H A P T E R K 
CONCLUSION ^ 
j* 
RMB Full Current Account Convertibility Achievable Before 2000 
Liberalization oftrade related current account transactions in 1994 was one big 
stride towards current account convertibility. Further liberalization of service related 
transactions in 1996 is residual compared with the reforms in 1994. 
Inspite of signals on export running out of steam and foreign direct investment 
inflow slowing down，the Chinese Government has been on the right track in 
managing its fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal deficit has been reduced to only 
about 10.9 percent offiscal expenditure in 1995 although it may take another four to 
five years to achieve a balanced budget. Inflation is also on a declining trend. First 
quarter inflation in 1996 is only 7.7 percent. Tight control on fiscal expenditure and 
money supply has become the consensus in the ninth year plan starting from 1996. 
Joining WTO may require another two years ofnegotiation and there is no imminent 
threat of massive import growth. 
Although current account surplus and capital account surplus may be marginally 
lower than the levels in 1995 due to slowing export growth and foreign investment 
inflow, barring unpredictable political development especially the tensions across the 
Formosa Strait, RMB exchange rate will remain stable or depreciate moderately in 
1996 under the managed floating rate regime. 
In such circumstances, it is likely that the Chinese Government will bring forward 
the schedule for full current account convertibility from 2000 to 1997 or 1998. Only 
minor items such as requiring foreign enterprises in China to balance foreign exchange 
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earnings and expenditure, and residual control on service transactions are remained to 
be liberalized. It is also expected that there will be further tariff reductions and trade 
liberalization in order to join WTO in two to three years, time. 
Business Implications 
The opportunities and risks ^ssociated with a liberalizing trade and foreign 
exchange policies are twofold. There will be more import and export trading 
opportunities but revenue based on RMB runs the risk of depreciation. 
With regard to more import and export trading opportunities, business 
organizations can position for selling to China those products that are either cheaper or 
have better quality than Chinese products. However, uncompetitive foreign products 
in terms of price or quality may not be able to reap benefits of import liberalization. 
To maintain payment balance in the current account, the Chinese Government will 
strengthen export along with the planned import liberalization. Measures to be taken 
may include controlling domestic inflation, export costs, and gradual depreciation of 
RMB. Such measures are all supportive to export ofPRC manufactured product and 
business organizations can concentrate on investing in state owned or setting up 
foreign enterprises that have comparative advantages in terms ofcost and quality in the 
international market. 
To foreign direct investments aiming at the Chinese domestic market, they can 
select those state owned or setting up foreign enterprises that can maintain cost and 
quality competitiveness in light of increasing import competition. Cement 
manufacturing is one example because low transport cost and delivery reliability are 
important to the customers. Ifforeign competition is unavoidable, business investors 
may select those domestic market oriented enterprises which have export 
competitiveness and the ability to diversify from the Chinese market and RMB revenue. 
To those investments such as infrastructure projects that are mainly targetting the 
domestic market, investors can take RMB depreciation into account in estimating 
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investment returns. Such estimation should also consider the tight fiscal and monetary 
policies to be adopted in the next few years in order to assist RMB's transformation to 
full current account convertibility. For example, both the foreign investors and their 
PRC partners will be facing a higher funding cost within the PRC. On the positive side, 
i f the investment retums can be produced，profits and dividends can be remitted from 
China easier than before. ^ 
^ 
In summary, with the trade and foreign exchange policies defined by the Chinese 
Government, the implications for business is a bottom up and sectoral approach 
focusing on the risks and rewards offered by different enterprises and industries. 
- T h e End -
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